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Abstract
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Elections are often believed to be influenced by the way the media covers political
candidates. This can, of course, stem from the media being ideologically biased either
on its own or through market segmentation in order to compete for viewership of ide-
ologically distinct constituencies. Media bias, in turn, can motivate political parties to
pander to the media to attract favourable endorsements, thus creating platform extrem-
ism and ideologically polarized contests. In this paper we show that the media does not
have to be biased, the voters need not be ideologically divided and the media market
need not be competitive for media presence to yield a polarized election. Being profit-
maximizing, even a monopoly media will respond to a demand for information. The
voter will be more interested in information about candidates whose governance abilities
are not as well-known as, say, the incumbent’s, and whose potential accession to office
has an ideological cost for the voter. The voter might still wish to consider such a less
well-known, more extreme challenger, if such a candidate signals the ability to perform
better than the incumbent in some non-ideological dimension that voters care about. Such
a demand for information about ideologically more extreme candidates would lead even
a non-ideological but profit-maximizing media to commit more resources for providing
such information. We show that this investment in news will increase with the ideological
extremism of the challenger, and this in turn will induce higher quality challengers to
strategically pick ideologically extreme (or polarized) electoral platforms.
Polarization in politics and the success of political challengers who espouse ideologies
away from the centre has been observed in a number of countries. As shown in Hare
and Poole (2014), Republican and Democrat politicians are further apart today than they
have ever been with an almost vanishing breed of centrist politicians. Interestingly,
there is strong evidence at the same time that politicians with more extreme positions
get more news coverage. McCluskey and Kim (2012) examined the coverage of 208
political action groups in 118 newspapers in the United States. They conclude that “groups
that expressed more polarized opinions on political issues were mentioned in larger
newspapers, appeared earlier in articles, and were mentioned in more paragraphs.” This
is not confined to the US alone. Even the unfavorable and persistent press coverage that
UK’s Jeremy Corbyn has recently received may have played a part in getting him elected
by highlighting his ‘character’ and his repeated refusal to pander to the median voter
which voters seemed to have liked. India’s current Prime Minister Narendra Modi was
considered to be a polarizing figure when he challenged the then ruling Congress party
in the 2014 General Elections. In the run up to the election, Modi got 7.5 times more
coverage than the Congress leadership. Several press releases and opinion polls suggest
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that voters saw him as a decisive leader who could nonetheless deliver a well-governed
India. Indeed as the New York Times reports, Modi, ‘has emerged with a bold, right-wing
narrative in a country with a staunchly socialist past’ even while the centrist Congress is
struggling with an image of policy paralysis.1
One may argue that polarization of politicians and success of extremist parties are
simply a response to the electorate becoming more ideologically dispersed. However
this does not seem to be the case. A 2014 survey by Pew Research Center finds that this
‘partisan sorting’ of party members in the US Congress extends only to those voters who
have strong political convictions. Also, as argued by Fiorina (2014), the distribution of
ideological preferences of American voters has been largely stable since the re-election of
Ronald Reagan, and if at all, attitudes of the general mass on most issues “continue to
cluster in the middle rather than lump up on the extremes.” In addition, Evans (2003) and
DiMaggio et al. (1996) find that many opinion distributions have become less dispersed
than in the past and more centered on one middle position. It has also been argued that
the ideologically extreme positions that challengers often take in the US may occur as a
result of their facing a more extreme group of voters in primaries. However, this does not
appear to be the cause either (see Shigeo et al. (2010)).2 This raises the question that if the
ideological distribution of voters remain largely stable or the average voters become more
centrist in their opinions, what can cause parties to diverge in their policy platforms?
A recent and influential literature in the field of media and politics advocates the notion
of media induced polarization and sorting, largely based upon suggestive evidence that
media has ideological bias, either through elite participation and representation or by the
demands of their ‘partisan’ viewership bases.3 Existence of media bias is argued to lead
politicians without an established valence to pander to this bias by choosing policy plat-
forms close to the ideal policies of the media in anticipation of obtaining more favorable
media endorsements about their calibre.4 Moreover, partisan media can potentially influ-
ence both professional politicians and voters with existing bias to become more distinctly
sorted as these partisan media can broadcast polarized views of otherwise established
1The full article can be found at “http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/what-makes-narendra-modi-
a-middle-class-hero/?r = 0′′.
2 Neither can this explain polarized politics in countries where the primary system is not prevalent nor
the ultimate success of ideologically extremist challengers across the globe.
3 Most of the literature concerns non-digital news. An exception is a recent work by Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2013).
4 The literature on media’s influence on politics is large (see e.g. Andina-Diaz (2006), Chiang and Knight
(2008), Della Vigna and Kaplan (2008), Anderson and McLaren (2012), Chakraborty and Ghosh (2015) and
Chakraborty et al. (2015). For an excellent survey see Prat and Stromberg (2013).
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elites. But an analytical survey by Prior (2013) on media and political polarization con-
cludes that “most large media outlets [in the US] are centrists compared to members of
Congress” and there is no compelling evidence that partisan media, even if it existed,
have made Americans more partisan. Moreover the survey suggests that “most voters
avoid partisan media altogether or mix and match across ideological lines. And those
who follow partisan media closely and select mostly one side are already partisan.”5
Nonetheless, the media’s influence in a vibrant democracy cannot be ignored and Prat
(2014) demonstrates that attention shares or ‘viewership’ is crucial in empirically deter-
mining the existing media power to influence electoral outcomes. In exercising this power
successfully, two aspects of the media market gain prominence, namely, ideological bias
and profit motives, and the possible connections between them. As shown in Bernhardt
et al. (2008), maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by slanting
the news and this bias may yield loss of information, potentially resulting in inefficient
electoral outcomes. Regarding competition, although Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) show
that media competition can partly enhance the quality of coverage, Gentzkow et al. (2014)
however find evidence that voters prefer like-minded news and that newspapers may
strategically choose political orientations to differentiate from competitors and enhance
viewership as well as revenue from advertisements. This enhances diversity and affects
political outcomes.
When the electorate is ideologically divided but uninformed about both valence as
well as ideological positions of competing political alternatives, media competition can
generate polarization even without media having to take strategic partisan stands. For
example, Perego and Yuksel (2015) show that competition amongst profit maximizing
non-partisan media outlets can segment such an electorate by broadcasting more news
on ideology rather than valence, thereby making voters more informed, and ultimately
sorted, in ideology. Although their work does not address how political parties may
respond to this ideological sorting of the voters through platform choice, one may argue
that such ideological sorting can then lead to platform divergence. As mentioned before,
we show that pure profit motives of the media with a goal to serve the electorate by selling
news about valence of political candidates can by itself manufacture extremist challengers
even when the electorate is ideologically united and media has no incentive to supply
5 Oliveros and Vardy (2014) show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates
this ‘mix and match’ in news consumption, leading to disproportionately higher demand for media outlets
that are centrist or only moderately biased. Bernhardt et al. (2006) show interestingly that if the media are
biased, then there are some news realizations such that the electorate appears more polarized to an outside
observer, even if citizens’ policy preferences do not change.
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slanted news. Moreover, we show that competition among media outlets is not necessary
for generating this platform divergence.
In this paper, we consider a profit-maximizing, dominant (monopolistic) media outlet
with no policy bias. The voter has firm beliefs about the quality of a populist incumbent
party while the media can provide information about a political challenger with unknown
quality by investing in costly coverage about the challenger, thereby generating signals
about his quality. It will do so provided the voter is willing to pay for this coverage. Voters
are ideologically similar (in our model identical) and value news about the challenger’s
unobserved quality. Their willingness to pay for this information increases with the degree
of platform extremism as that makes the unknown challenger a more risky political
alternative, inducing them to ‘buy’ news in increasing quantities. As a consequence,
platform extremism yields the required opportunities for a profit-seeking media to invest
in coverage and at the same time provides strong incentives to a high-quality challenger
to strategically reveal her type to the voters via media coverage induced through platform
extremism. Thus, ideological polarization occurs but interestingly, it does so without
either the candidate or the media having any ideological leaning or the electorate being
ideologically divided. In this paper we formalize this theoretical premise and obtain it as
an equilibrium outcome. In particular, if the incumbent is less likely to be of high-quality
than the challenger, we show that platform extremism to attract media coverage is a robust
equilibrium feature. Also if cost of political entry is small, there is neither pro-nor-anti
incumbency once the challenger has announced his policy but before the media coverage
is conducted. Otherwise with higher entry costs the equilibrium is one where there is
anti-incumbency. If on the other hand the incumbent is more likely to be of high quality
than the challenger, then platform extremism disappears when entry costs are small.
Two issues are worth emphasizing. First, that the presence of an informative media
is crucial to induce polarization in our model. Without a media outlet, the mechanism of
signaling through extremism will break down, as with the absence of a credible source
for verifying quality a low-quality challenger will always mimic the actions of the high
type by choosing the same policy. Thus, elections will not help the voter learn about the
quality of the challenger at the time of voting. Second, the presence of a profit-seeking
media but with some ideological bias may in fact reduce extremism, if anything. This is
because media bias can destroy the credibility of news when the platform chosen by the
challenger is ‘embarrassingly’ close to the media’s ideology. On the other hand, taking an
extremist position far away from the media bias and on the opposite side of the ideology
spectrum may take away the media’s incentives to use resources on coverage even if that
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generated viewership. These two forces put together can induce high-quality challengers
to reduce extremism in comparison to what is obtained with an unbiased media.
Although the profit motive of the media induces a high-quality challenger to take
extremist policy platforms, our analysis also suggests that both the media as well as the
voter can sometimes get it wrong. This is due to the fact that in equilibrium, low-quality
challengers mimic the actions of their high-quality counterparts with strictly positive
probability. Thus, while fear of media revelations and the high costs of contesting elections
screen out low-quality candidates to an extent and allow political competition to be
somewhat informative, given the tradeoff between informativeness and loss of ideological
alignment, the degree of extremism gets bounded. Even at the upper bound of extremism,
some mimicking by low-quality candidates may occur. This, coupled with the possibility
that media coverage may at times fail to be informative, implies that the electorate can elect
a political challenger with low calibre who appears with an unpopular platform, obtains
significant amount of media coverage that nevertheless yields no substantial information,
and the electorate believes, mistakenly, that the challenger is of high quality.
The other important feature of the presence of a profit-seeking media lies in the voter’s
preferences between the two candidates in equilibrium. Provided the voter chooses either
candidate with strictly positive probability in the event he is indifferent, at the time the
media launches its coverage, the voter must be indifferent between the two alternatives.
This means that the equilibrium platform extremism chosen by the high-quality challenger
to attract media attention is just enough to offset any pre-coverage bias in the voter’s mind
towards one candidate or another. This is due to the fact that while excessive extremism is
unable to sufficiently reduce low-quality participation, it reduces the voter’s willingness
to pay for news, thereby reducing media coverage that hurts the high-quality challengers.
Hence demand for electoral news about candidate quality is maximum and the market
for electoral news is most active in that state of voter indifference.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. We present the model in Section 1 and analyse
the demand and supply for media coverage in Section 2. Section 3 shows how a challenger
strategically chooses an extreme position in response to the ensuing equilibrium in the
market for news. Additional discussion on our model and results and its relations to the
existing literature is provided in Section 4. The paper concludes in Section 5.
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1 The model
We present a simple model to demonstrate how the media’s incentive to maximize profits,
the electorate’s incentive to learn about a challenger’s quality and the challenger’s incen-
tive to signal quality generate platform extremism.6 To make things stark and rule out
the possibility of strategic market segmentation, we consider a single swing (or median)
voter who elects one of two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger (or entrant). The
qualities of the incumbent and the challenger are not perfectly known and each can be one
of two types: high (H) or low (L). The quality of a candidate pertains to non-ideological
issues – ability to provide good governance, keep the government corruption-free or main-
tain law and order – or some attribute, be it character or valence, on which voters agree
i.e. a higher valence or better governance is preferred by all voters and hence electing a
candidate of high quality yields an additional utility of h > 0 to the voter (while this utility
is normalized to 0 if the candidate is of low quality).
The incumbent i in the model is not a strategic player. He is a populist and his policy
platform is the voter’s ideal policy 0. Moreover, his past performance makes the voter
believe that he can be of type H with probability ρi and this belief cannot be changed by
any additional information. The challenger (candidate e) on the other hand does not have
such a ‘firmly established reputation’ and the prior probability that he is type H is γ.7 In
this environment, the entrant either contests the election by choosing a policy platform
from R or stays out.
The voter has Euclidian preference over policies. In particular, if candidate e commits
to a policy platform in R that is z ≥ 0 distance away from the voter’s ideal policy 0 and
gets elected and the voter believes the challenger is of type H with probability ρe, then the
voter’s utility is −z + ρeh. We call z the degree of extremism in the entrant’s policy choice.
Electing candidate i yields a payoff of ρih.
Before making his decision, and after candidate e enters the competition by announcing
a policy with degree of extremism z, the voter has the option of using a paid media source
to learn more about the true quality of the unknown challenger. In particular, a monopoly
(or dominant) profit-seeking media invests in the size of media coverage Q ∈ [0, 1] that
6 Duggan and Martinelli (2011) also study a model of elections with an unknown challenger. But lack
of information there is about the challenger’s fiscal policy, rather than quality. Although the media in their
case enjoys monopoly power as in our case, it has an a priori bias for or against the challenger, but otherwise
there is no profit motives. They show that a biased media can be more informative than an unbiased one.
7An alternative interpretation is that the incumbent’s quality is known while the challenger can be
of either higher or lower quality when compared to the incumbent. In that sense one can think of the
incumbent’s known quality to be qi with L < qi = ρiH + (1 − ρi)L < H.
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is perfectly observable and that costs c(Q) to the media. We assume c(Q) is differentiable,
strictly increasing and convex with c′(0) = 0 and c′(1) = +∞. A coverage amount Q reveals
the true quality of e with probability Q while with probability 1−Q it reveals no additional
information.
Upon observing Q the voter decides whether to pay an access fee F ≥ 0 set by the
media in order to follow the media coverage. The media sets F in order to extract all
surplus from the voter and chooses Q accordingly to maximize its profit which equals the
voter’s surplus from information net of costs c(Q).
Keeping in mind the anticipated behaviour of the media, the challenger chooses a
strategy, which is an entry decision and a degree of extremism z conditional on entry,
that is dependent on the entrant’s type. Formally, we denote the strategy as σ : {L,H} →
∆(R+ ∪ {out}) where ∆ denotes the space of probability distributions over R+ ∪ {out}.
Entry requires a cost of κ > 0. If the potential entrant enters and wins he earns 1 + κ
(that is, office rent over-compensates the cost of entry by an amount 1) while if he loses he
earns 0. Staying out yields a payoff of 0 as well.
This environment yields a 3-player signalling game with the following time structure:
• Stage 1: Challenger e chooses σ i.e. it announces its entry and platform choice;
• Stage 2: The media observes z if the outcome of σ yields so, chooses the degree of
coverage Q ∈ [0, 1] and announces the access fee F; if σ yields “out”, the media does
nothing and the game ends;
• Stage 3: The voter observes z, Q and F and either votes without media news or pays
F and uses media news to update information about the quality of candidate e and
votes for the candidate that maximizes his expected utility.
In the next two sections we analyze the outcome of this game i.e. we look at electoral
and media activity as (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium outcomes of the game described in
this section.
2 Market for electoral news
In this section we analyze the demand and supply for news when the political challenger
has already committed to his policy platform. At this stage, the voter forms his beliefs
about the challenger’s quality, given the challenger’s entry and platform decision, and
considers whether to pay the fee F to access media coverage for additional information.
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Anticipating the voter’s willingness to pay, the media chooses an optimal amount of costly
coverage to maximize its profits. Put together, the challenger’s strategy creates a market
for electoral news.
As demand (and therefore supply) for media information about the entrant is positive
only if σ is not fully revealing, we will focus on continuation games that follow strategies
of the entrant that are not fully revealing as well. Thus, we will focus attention on the
following strategy of the entrant, denoted by σp, wherein a type H entrant enters the
contest with some platform extremism z with probability 1 while his type L counterpart
randomizes between entering at z with probability p and staying out with probability 1−p.
Note, all partially revealing equilibria must have one type randomize in this fashion.8
Let ρ(σp) be the interim belief held by the voter before using the media that the entrant
with platform promise z is of type H. Then,
ρ(σp) =
γ
γ + p(1 − γ) . (1)
Note that ρ(σp) > γ if and only if p < 1. In this regard, only if p = 1 is σp is a babbling
strategy for any z ≥ 0 as both types enter with certainty so the entry decision conveys no
information. Otherwise σp is informative. Also note that in all circumstances z ≤ h(1 − ρi)
as otherwise the voter votes for the incumbent irrespective of his beliefs regarding the
quality of the entrant. This is because if the degree of extremism is greater than h(1 − ρi),
the expected gain from the high type being in office is offset by ideological loss from
having a policy too far from the voter’s ideal point. In what follows we will therefore
restrict z to be less than h(1 − ρi).
2.1 Demand for coverage
We first address demand for media coverage in the continuation game that follows the
play of σp with the outcome where the challenger chooses entry and the voter observes
that the entrant has announced a platform with degree of extremism z. We will assume
that the voter uses a pure strategy in his decision about media access. With p > 0 , the
voter is not sure about the quality of the challenger, believing currently that he is of type H
with probability ρ(σp) as defined in (1). Thus, he has an incentive to acquire information
and the value he places on getting extra information increases with extremism up to a
point as the higher the ideological distance the bigger the loss in utility from ideological
distance and hence the lower the expected utility from voting a low type challenger into
8All equilibria will share this feature of being partially revealing, barring the one in Proposition 3.
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power. However, beyond a point, the voter’s interest in the entrant’s quality (and so his
incentive to acquire news) gets diminished if this distance z is simply too high which
makes the entrant unattractive irrespective of his quality. In addition to the degree of
extremism, the voter’s willingness to pay also depends on the level of coverage Q as that
determines quality of news. If quality of news is poor (i.e. its informative value is low),
its value is lower and thus the voter is willing to pay less for it. We derive the voter’s
valuation (demand) for news as a function of platform extremism z and size of media
coverage Q. The analysis is divided into the two situations of interim anti-incumbency
(IAI) and interim pro-incumbency (IPI).
Interim anti-incumbency (IAI): Irrespective of prior beliefs for or against the incumbent,
the challenger’s strategy σp can sway the voter’s preferences towards either of the two
candidates. If the platform dissent is not too high and if the probability with which a
low-quality challenger mimics entry is sufficiently low, we can be in a situation where
without any additional information from the media the voter prefers the entrant to the
incumbent. If the voter votes for the entrant with positive probability when indifferent, a
situation of anti-incumbency occurs if and only if z ≤ h(ρ(σp) − ρi). Note that since z ≥ 0,
for this case to hold it must be that ρ(σp) > ρi from which it follows that γ is sufficiently
high and p sufficiently low, as expected under an anti-incumbency environment. In such
a situation, if the voter decides not to use the media coverage, he votes for the entrant
candidate e and obtains a payoff equal to
U no access (σp| IAI ) = −z + ρ(σp)h.
On the other hand, if the voter uses media that has announced a coverage level Q, then he
foresees the following. With probability Qρ(σp) the entrant’s type will be revealed to be
H in which case he will vote for the entrant, yielding a payoff of −z + h. With probability
Q(1 − ρ(σp)) the entrant’s type will be revealed to be L in which case he will vote for the
incumbent, yielding a payoff of ρih. Lastly, with probability 1−Q the media coverage will
yield no additional information and so he will continue to vote for the entrant (unless he
is indifferent in which case he mixes), yielding a payoff of −z +ρ(σp)h. Hence by using the
media coverage, the voter’s payoff is
Uaccess(σp| IAI ) = Qρ(σp)(−z + h) + Q(1 − ρ(σp))ρih + (1 −Q)(−z + ρ(σp)h).
So let V(σp| IAI ) denote the voter’s valuation of media coverage at strategy σp when
there is interim anti-incumbency. Then V(σp| IAI ) = U access (σp| IAI ) − U no access (σp| IAI )
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i.e. it is the difference in utility between using the media information, and voting only
according to interim priors. By substitution, this yields
V(σp| IAI ) = Q(1 − ρ(σp))(z + ρih). (2)
Interim pro-incumbency (IPI): This is a situation where without any additional information
from the media the voter prefers the incumbent to the entrant. This happens if and only if
z > h(ρ(σp)− ρi). In this case, without media coverage, the voter votes for the incumbent i
and obtains a payoff of
U no access (σp| IPI ) = ρih.
On the other hand if he goes for the media coverage, then like before, the voter foresees
the following. With probability Qρ(σp) the entrant’s type will be revealed to be H and and
so he will vote for the entrant, yielding a payoff of −z + h. With probability Q(1 − ρ(σp))
the entrant’s type will be revealed to be L and so he will vote for the incumbent, yielding
a payoff of ρih. And with probability 1 −Q the media coverage will yield no information
and so he will continue to vote for the incumbent to obtain a payoff of ρih. Hence by using
the media coverage, the voter’s payoff becomes
U access (σp| IPI ) = Qρ(σp)(−z + h) + Q(1 − ρ(σp))ρih + (1 −Q)ρih.
As before, let V(σp| IPI ) denote the voter’s valuation of media coverage at strategy σp
under interim pro-incumbency. Then V(σp| IPI ) = U access (σp| IPI ) − U no access (σp| IPI ),
that is
V(σp| IPI ) = Qρ(σp)(h(1 − ρi) − z). (3)
With the expressions for the voter’s value of media coverage, we are in a position to
characterize his demand for electoral news defined by the surplus it generates for the
voter. Lemma 1 deals with this. The proof is straightforward as the expression V(σp| IAI )
(respectively, V(σp| IPI )) increases (respectively, decreases) in z, and it can be further
checked that z = h(ρ(σp) − ρi) is their unique intersection point.
Lemma 1 The voter’s demand (or willingness to pay) for media coverage is given by the following
expression:
V(σp) =

Q(1 − ρ(σp))(z + ρih) if z ≤ h(ρ(σp) − ρi)
Qρ(σp)(h(1 − ρi) − z) if z > h(ρ(σp) − ρi).
(4)
Moreover,
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1. Starting from a state of interim anti-incumbency (i.e., z ≤ h(ρ(σp) − ρi)) demand increases
in z (and p) up to the point where z = h(ρ(σp) − ρi),
2. Starting from a state of interim pro-incumbency (i.e., z > h(ρ(σp) − ρi)) demand falls in z
(and p), and
3. Demand increases unambiguously in degree of coverage Q.
A relatively small ideological distance (for a fixed likelihood p of low-quality partici-
pation in the market for political alternative) induces anti-incumbency during the interim
phase of an election. In this situation a rise in extremism increases demand for news as
the voter wants the entrant to win but more extremism increases the risk of electing a
candidate who is after all unknown. This continues up to a point when anti-incumbency
is wiped out as now the extremism is such that the voter is just indifferent between the
two political alternatives. It is at this stage that the voter’s willingness to pay for news
coverage is maximum, after which further extremism brings us in a pro-incumbency sit-
uation and the voter’s interest shifts away from the entrant. Thereafter demand for news
about the entrant’s quality falls monotonically in extremism. Now let us fix extremism
and look at the impact of p. With a p close to 0, we are again in strong anti-incumbency,
but this time it is driven by the high likelihood of having a H type challenger. Thus,
demand for news is small as the chances of voting in a low-quality challenger is small and
therefore, willingness to pay for knowing the type is low. As p increases, i.e. probability
of low-quality entrants increase, the force of anti-incumbency falls. This then increases
demand for news once more as the voter finds it more and more risky to elect the entrant.
This rise in demand reaches a maximum again at the value of p where the voter becomes
indifferent between electing the incumbent or the entrant. Beyond this point a further
rise in p reduces demand for information. Thus, as expected, platform extremism and
the likelihood of low-quality participation act hand in hand in their impact on demand.
The important message from this analysis is that demand for electoral news is maximum
when there is no pro or anti incumbency in this interim phase of the elections.
2.2 Supply of coverage
Given the explicit demand function for coverage as in (4), we now find the profit maxi-
mizing choice of Q for a fixed strategy σp. As the media sets the access fee F to extract the
entire surplus from the voter, in equilibrium we have F = V(σp). Thus the profit function
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of the media is given by the voter’s willingness to pay less cost of coverage:
pi(σp) = V(σp) − c(χ).
Notice that V(·) is differentiable in Q. Further, our assumptions on c(·) imply that
there exists a unique maximizer of pi(σp), denoted by Q∗, that is strictly positive whenever
V(σp) > 0. Lemma 2 completely characterizes equilibrium coverage. As c(·) is strictly
convex, c′ is strictly increasing in Q over the entire domain. Given this and the facts that
c′(0) = 0 and c′(1) = +∞, Lemma 2 is immediate.
Lemma 2 Let Q∗ be the profit maximizing media coverage given the entrant’s strategy σp. Then
Q∗ is unique and is given implicitly by
c′(Q∗) =

(1 − ρ(σp))(z + ρih) if z ≤ h(ρ(σp) − ρi)
ρ(σp)(h(1 − ρi) − z) if z > h(ρ(σp) − ρi).
(5)
Moreover,
1. Starting from a state of interim anti-incumbency (i.e., z < h(ρ(σp) − ρi)), a rise in z, ρi or h
increases Q∗ while a rise in ρ(σp) (through either a rise in γ or fall in p) decreases Q∗;
2. Starting from a state of interim pro-incumbency (i.e., z > h(ρ(σp) − ρi)), a rise in h or a rise
in ρ(σp) (through either a rise in γ or fall in p) increase Q∗ while a rise in ρi and a rise in z
decreases Q∗.
The important message from the nature of the media’s optimal response to the en-
trant’s partially revealing strategy is that while in an interim anti-incumbency phase, a
rise in extremism increases media coverage, in an interim pro-incumbency phase this
happens when extremism decreases. This coupled with the fact that demand for news
is maximum when extremism makes the voter indifferent between the two contesting
political alternatives implies the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 The market for media coverage of a political challenger is most active when in the
interim phase, there are neither pro nor anti incumbency trends.
In the next section we follow up on Corollary 1 to see how it affects the political equilibrium.
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3 Equilibrium political challenge
A high-quality challenger in our model has incentives to enhance media coverage while
this incentive is completely missing for his low-quality counterpart. This can generate
a belief in the mind of the voter that extremism typically comes from high-quality chal-
lengers as it is extremism that generates demand for news and hence media attention. We
model such beliefs in its simplest form through a step function that is weakly monotone
in platform extremism. It is then natural for one to examine the strategy σp described
in Section 1, along with consistent and monotone beliefs, and look for conditions under
which they constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the whole game.
Given the ensuing market equilibrium for media coverage (given by (2)) that follows
from the strategy σp, we now find conditions on extremism and the low type’s random-
ization such that σp constitutes an equilibrium. In order to do so, we first specify beliefs of
the voter ‘off-the-equilibrium path’ of play. The weakly monotone step-function property
is used in the construction of these beliefs, parameterized by some extremism z > 0 and
denoted by µz: (i) if any extremism z′ ≥ z is observed and the voter receives no further
information from the media, then he believes that candidate e is of type H with probability
ρ(σp); otherwise media information reveals type and the voter follows the revelation; (ii)
If any extremism z′ < z is observed then with no further information from the media, the
voter believes that e is type H with probability 0 <  < ρi and otherwise follows media
revelation.
As we shall see, existence and nature of equilibrium will depend crucially upon how
the voter votes between the two political alternatives when he stands indifferent between
the two. So let 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 denote the probability with which the voter votes for the
challenger in this case. However we will throughout assume that when the voter is
indifferent between using or not using media coverage, he uses it with probability 1.
3.1 Low entry cost, γ < 1/2 and ρi < 1/2
First consider the case when the entry cost for the challenger is small, in particular κ <
1
c′−1(h/4) − 1, and there is a low probability of either the incumbent or the challenger being
high-quality candidates i.e. both. γ < 1/2 and ρi < 1/2. How would a low-quality
challenger behave in such a scenario? Since he is randomizing between entry at z and
staying out, his equilibrium payoff must equal 0 and any deviation must not yield a higher
payoff. Given the beliefs of the voter that we just described, if he shows any extremism
z′ < z then he loses with probability 1 since  < ρi and pays the cost κ.
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By standing at z, he gets revealed (and therefore loses) with probability Q∗ and pays
the cost κ, while with probability 1 − Q∗ he stands a chance to win, provided this entry
yields interim anti-incumbency with −z + ρ(σp)h ≥ ρih (a condition required for the voter
to vote for him). Hence his expected payoff from standing at z is:
u(σp|L) =

1 −Q∗ − κQ∗ if z < h(ρ(σp) − ρi)
(1 −Q∗)(x − κ(1 − x)) − κQ∗ if z = h(ρ(σp) − ρi)
−κ otherwise .
(6)
Taking any position z′ > z can only diminish this payoff. To see this observe that if
z < h(ρ(σp) − ρi) then a deviation such that z′ ≤ h(ρ(σp) − ρi) increases Q∗ (see (2)) that
strictly harms the L type entrant. If z′ > h(ρ(σp)−ρi) then irrespective of the outcome from
media coverage the voter strictly prefers i as the entrant is of type L. The argument is
similar for z = h(ρ(σp)−ρi). Since this expected payoff must be 0 in equilibrium due to the
randomization, for σp to constitute an equilibrium, it must be that z ≤ h(ρ(σp)− ρi). In any
event, since in equilibrium the L-type’s payoff cannot be negative, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 3 If ρ(σp) constitutes an equilibrium it must be that z ≤ h(ρ(σp) − ρi).
We now turn to the type-H entrant. Recall that in any equilibrium we have z ≤ h(1−ρi)
as otherwise the voter always votes for the incumbent. Hence we can restrict deviations
z′ in the interval [0, h(1− ρi)]. Suppose z = h(ρ(σp)− ρi) so that we are in a situation where
in the interim phase of the elections, the voter is neither anti nor pro incumbent and
votes for the challenger with probability x. A deviation z′ > z that increases extremism
reduces media coverage Q∗ (see (2)) and at the same time leads to pro-incumbency. Thus
a deviation through increased extremism cannot be profitable. So consider a moderation
z′ < z. Given the beliefs µz of the voters, this deviation will strictly harm the entrant. It
is also clear that the requirement z = h(ρ(σp) − ρi) is necessary for this equilibrium if and
only if 0 < x < 1. This is because when z < h(ρ(σp) − ρi), the voter cannot be indifferent
between the entrant and the incumbent and it must be that x = 1, a contradiction with the
voter’s mixed strategy.
Given this, we next consider the incentive of the type H entrant to attract media
attention that yields a choice of z that maximizes the voter’s surplus from information so
that it yields the highest attainable media coverage Q. Observe that from Lemma 2 and the
fact that in equilibrium we have −z +ρh = ρih, it follows that media’s profit maximization
condition can be written as
c′(Q∗) = (h − (z + hρi))
(
z + hρi
h
)
.
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As c′(·) > 0, if z is chosen to maximize the RHS of the above condition, it also increases Q∗.
Hence, the type H candidate initiates z that maximizes
S(z) := (h − (z + hρi))
(
z + hρi
h
)
.
This yields
z∗ = h
(1
2
− ρi
)
,
which is strictly positive since ρi < 1/2. But this means ρ(σp) = 1/2 from which it follows
that
p∗ =
γ
1 − γ.
Since 0 < γ < 1/2 we have 0 < p < 1. Using these observations we have
(h − (z + hρi))
(
z + hρi
h
)
=
h
4
,
so that the media’s profit maximizing condition in the ‘general’ equilibrium becomes
c′(Q∗) = h4 . Finally we obtain the equilibrium value of the voter’s mixed strategy x from
the type L entrant’s indifference equation given by
(1 −Q∗)(x − κ(1 − x)) − κQ∗ = 0,
that yields
x∗ =
κ
(1 −Q∗)(1 + κ) .
It is always true that x > 0. For x ≤ 1, we require Q∗ ≤ 11+κ , which from the profit
maximizing condition of the media yields c′−(h/4) ≤ 11+κ .
Thus we have proved our first main result.
Proposition 1 Suppose κ < 1c′−1(h/4) −1, γ < 1/2 and ρi < 1/2. Then the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (σp∗ , µz∗ ,Q∗, x∗) yields z∗ = h
(
1
2 − ρi
)
, p∗ = γ1−γ , c
′(Q∗) = h/4 and x∗ = κ(1−Q∗)(1+κ) ,
with 0 < p∗, 0 < x∗ < 1 and z∗ > 0. In this equilibrium, (i) the size of extremism z∗ rises as the
probability of the incumbent being high quality falls, reaching h/2 as this probability goes to 0 and
(ii) there is neither pro nor anti-incumbency where the voter votes for the extremist challenger and
the populist incumbent with strictly positive probabilities when media coverage is uninformative.
Proposition 1 shows that when voters care about the quality of a relatively unknown
political challenger, existence of a profit-seeking media ‘manufactures’ platform extrem-
ism through which a high-quality candidate attracts higher media coverage in order to
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communicate with the voter through the media. Fear of media revelations keep checks
on low-quality participation though a low-quality entrant mimics high-quality strategies
with some probability. The probability with which a low-quality entrant enters equals
the prior odds in favor of the entrant being type H. This is obtained as the unique per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium under a robust set of sufficient conditions that relate cost of
competing in elections and importance of quality in the voter’s utility. Further, the voter
is indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger and votes for each with strictly
positive probabilities.
3.1.1 Implications of Proposition 1
As mentioned before, the possibility of extremism to act as an instrument to signal quality
induces the voter to encourage extremism as reflected in the weak monotone beliefs.
However this encouragement attracts low-quality entrants to (mis)-signal quality through
mimicry of their high-quality counterparts. This ‘partially informative’ environment for
the voter requires a media that promises to act as a means of communication between the
entrant and the voter, a ‘watchdog’ to prevent low-quality participation and at the same
time a facilitator for competent entry. But this occurs where the media has no interest
in politics or the welfare of the voter and its investigative incentive comes entirely from
wishing to make profits through viewership.
Clearly, this works in favour of a high-quality entrant as well. When extremism
can only partially reveal his type, higher extremism increases the voter’s willingness to
pay for media news, making room for the media to reap profits through covering the
entrant during the late phase of the election. The high-quality entrant foresees this and
chooses an optimal amount of extremism that maximizes the value of electoral news and
in turn maximizes this coverage. In other words, political positioning creates a market for
electoral news while news creates an opportunity for voters to elect better quality leaders
via transmission of additional information through electoral strategies and thwarting of
low-quality participation to a large extent. Indeed in the event the voter obtains no
further information from following the media coverage, he remains indifferent and votes
for each political alternative with strictly positive probability. Proposition 1 characterizes
the ‘fixed-point’ attained when both the news market and the political market are in
equilibrium simultaneously.
Our analysis in the following subsections will contrast with Proposition 1 in three
different directions. First we will characterize conditions under which political entry
will signal quality but without platform extremism (Proposition 2). The second direction
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(Proposition 3) will be in informativeness of entry where we will find conditions such
that while extremism will prevail, the voter will know little about the challenger from this
entry decision and will have to bank entirely upon the media to obtain information, if
any. Lastly we will look at equilibria where there will be strong interim anti-incumbency
(Proposition 4). Interestingly, these four types of equilibria are unique under the conditions
they exist and moreover are mutually exclusive and exhaustive of the parametric space of
our framework. Put together these conditions are both necessary and sufficient for each
type of equilibrium.9
3.2 Low entry cost, ρi ≥ 1/2 and γ < ρi
We continue with the case that cost of entry is low (κ < 1c′−1(h/4) − 1) but now assume that
the incumbent’s past performance makes the voter believe that he is more likely to be a
high-quality politician (viz.ρi ≥ 1/2). We now look at the case when γ < ρi i.e. the ex ante
(pre-entry) probability of their being a potential high-quality challenger is less than the
prior about the incumbent being of high quality.
Note first that the objective function of the type H challenger remains the same, i.e.
he chooses z to maximize S(z). Since S(z) is strictly concave for all values of h and ρi, the
basic features of the analysis in Section 3.1 continues, except that when ρi ≥ 1/2, (denoting
equilibrium values now with the superscript ∗∗), this optimization yields a corner solution
z∗∗ = 0. This follows from the observation that dS(z)dz |z=0 = 1 − 2ρi ≤ 0 if and only if ρi ≥ 1/2.
Thus, we obtain z∗∗ = 0 whenρi ≥ 1/2. This coupled with the voter’s indifference condition
z∗∗ = h(ρ(σz∗∗) − ρi) yields ρ(σz∗∗) = ρi from where one obtains
p∗∗ =
(
γ
1 − γ
) (
1 − ρi
ρi
)
< 1
since we are in the case where γ < ρi. Using the media’s profit maximizing condition as
before we obtain
c′(Q∗∗) = h(1 − ρi)ρi.
It is straightforward to see that since ρi ≥ 1/2, c′(Q∗∗) < c′(Q∗), implying Q∗∗ < Q∗ as
expected. Also, from the indifference condition of the type L entrant, it now follows that
9 While we have allowed the entrant to use mixed strategies and the voter to use mixed strategies while
choosing between the entrant and the incumbent, we have only considered pure strategies for the media
while choosing the fee and the coverage and for the voter while deciding between using media coverage
or voting by his own beliefs. Allowing mixed strategies everywhere can generate other equilibria as in
Section 3.4.
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x∗∗ < x∗. Finally note that since we are in the case κ < 1c′−1(h/4)−1 and since h(1−ρi)ρi < h4 , we
satisfy this parametric restriction. This analysis is collected in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose κ < 1c′−1(h/4) − 1, ρi ≥ 1/2 and γ < ρi. Then the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (σp∗∗ , µz∗∗ ,Q∗∗, x∗∗) yields z∗∗ = 0, p∗∗ =
(
γ
1−γ
) (
1−ρi
ρi
)
, c′(Q∗∗) = h(1 − ρi)ρi and x∗∗ =
κ
(1−Q∗∗)(1+κ) , with 0 < p
∗∗ < 1, 0 < x∗∗ < 1. In this equilibrium, (i) while there is no extremism,
political entry itself will signal strength and (ii) there is neither pro nor anti-incumbency where the
voter votes for the populist challenger and the populist incumbent with strictly positive probabilities
when media coverage is uninformative.
Proposition 2 shows that if the cost of entry is relatively small, if the voter believes that
the incumbent is likely to be of high quality (viz. ρi > 1/2) and if the ex ante probability
of the challenger being of high quality is lower than the incumbent, there is still an
equilibrium such that there is neither pro nor anti incumbency post entry. However in
this case the challenger enters with a populist platform. Existence of a strong incumbent
party, who is also perceived to be stronger than his political challenger ex-ante, leaves
little room for the challenger to use extremism as a signaling instrument and thus one
obtains policy convergence. In spite of candidates converging in policy platforms, the
threat of media revelation still keeps a low-quality candidate out of the contest with some
probability.
Although the voter cannot distinguish between the two candidates in terms of plat-
forms, there is still some chance that the entrant will be of high quality (and therefore better
than the reasonably well preforming incumbent). Hence even when both the incumbent
and the challenger are populists, there is some demand for media coverage that a profit
seeking media provides. As the main motivation of the paper was to find conditions un-
der which media exacerbates extremism, Proposition 2 is important as it characterizes the
only environment in our framework when the challenger takes the incumbent’s populist
stand.
3.3 Low entry cost and 1/2 < ρi < γ
We now move to an environment where cost of entry is still low (viz. κ < 1c′−1(h/4)−1) and the
incumbent has performed well in the past (ρi > 1/2), but he faces a strong challenger who
is believed to be more likely to be of high quality than the incumbent (viz. 1/2 < ρi < γ). In
this case, one would expect extremism to reappear and our analysis proves this to be true.
However, and somewhat surprisingly, such strong ex-ante prospects of the challenger
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makes democracy run out of steam to thwart low-quality participation even under a
‘watchdog’ media.
To see this observe that in the case under study, p∗∗ as defined in Proposition 2 will
exceed 1. In fact, such a high γ allows the low-quality entrant to free ride on the fact that
demand for media coverage will in any case be low (even if he entered with probability 1)
so that a profit seeking media will not invest enough in coverage. This dampens the risk
faced by a low-quality entrant from being revealed. Denoting equilibrium values by ,ˆ we
now characterize this equilibrium.
Suppose entry takes place at some zˆ ≥ 0 but both types enter with probability 1. As the
voter is indifferent between the challenger and the incumbent, it must be that zˆ = h(γ−ρi).
Using this, the profit maximizing condition of the media yields
c′(Qˆ) = h(1 − γ)γ.
It can be shown that zˆ can be higher or lower that z∗ in Proposition 1 depending upon how
large is γ.
Denoting by ρ∗i as an appropriately fixed value of ρi for Proposition 1 with ρ
∗
i < 1/2,
we have zˆ > z∗ if γ − 1/2 > ρi − ρ∗i and zˆ < z∗ otherwise. Using the equilibrium value zˆ in
the media’s optimization condition yields that Qˆ < Q∗ since γ > 1/2. We summarize these
observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose κ < 1c′−1(h/4) − 1 and 1/2 < ρi < γ. Then the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (σpˆ, µzˆ, Qˆ, xˆ) yields zˆ = h(γ − ρi), pˆ = 1, c′(Qˆ) = h(1 − γ)γ and xˆ = κ(1−Qˆ)(1+κ) , with
0 < xˆ < 1. In this equilibrium, (i) while there is extremism, political entry itself signals no
strength and (ii) there is neither pro nor anti-incumbency where the voter votes for the extremist
challenger and the populist incumbent with strictly positive probabilities when media coverage is
uninformative.
In our exercise, Proposition 3 is the only case where both types of challengers contest
with probability 1. This is a situation where voters believe both incumbent and challenger
are more likely to be of high quality but there is ex-ante anti-incumbency. In this situation,
even if there is platform extremism, the interim beliefs are still strongly in favor of the
challenger and so the low-quality challenger always enters the contest and mimics his
high-quality counterpart. Thus, entry carries no further information over the prior beliefs
of the voter and platform extremism is purely driven by the high-quality challenger’s
incentives to attract more media coverage that the low-quality counterpart can afford
without facing too much risk. In addition, strong priors for a high-quality entrant keeps
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the demand for news down, thereby reducing coverage below Q∗, the amount when the
low-quality entrant stayed out of the contest with strictly positive probability. In summary,
an highly extremist challenger who is regarded a priori to be of a relatively high quality
is observed and the media coverage is low.
3.4 High cost of entry
In the above analysis, the voter’s equilibrium mandate is ‘unpredictable’ as he is random-
izing between the entrant and the incumbent whenever the media coverage is revealing
no additional information. For existence of that class of equilibria it was necessary that κ
was not too high (viz. not higher than 1c′−1(h/4) − 1). But what if entry costs are higher?
We begin by noting that when κ exceeds the threshold value of 1c′−1(h/4) − 1, the low-
quality entrant will not enter provided the voter votes for the challenger with probability 1
when indifferent. In this case, given Lemma 3, the type H challenger wins with probability
1 since in the event the media reveals no additional information (probability 1−Q), there is
‘behavioral’ anti-incumbency and the voter votes for the challenger, while in the event the
media reveals information (with probability Q), the voter knows his type. Hence a high-
quality challenger is indifferent across all degrees of extremism z ≤ h(ρ(σp) − ρi). On the
other hand, since a low-quality candidate is randomizing between entry at z and staying
out, his indifferent condition, with x = 1, becomes (1−Q)−κQ = 0. Denoting equilibrium
values now with ,˜ this yields the equilibrium coverage Q˜ = 11+κ . It is straightforward
to verify that Q˜ < Q∗ and this is expected as with a behavioral inclination towards the
challenger, the value for news is lower.
How does this affect participation from a low-quality challenger and the degree of
extremism that his high-quality counterpart may choose to initiate? Using the media’s
optimization condition, we know c′(Q˜) = (1 − ρ(σp))(z + ρih). This yields an equilibrium
relation between p˜ and z˜ given by
c′−1
( 1
1 + κ
)
=
(
1 − γ
γ + p(1 − γ)
)
(z + ρih). (7)
We summarize this analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose κ > 1c′−1(h/4) − 1. Then the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria consists of a
continuum of strategy profiles and beliefs (σp˜, µz˜, Q˜, x˜) such that Q˜ = 11+κ , x˜ = 1 and (p˜, z˜) such
that Condition (7) is satisfied with z˜ ≤ h(σp˜ − ρi). In this equilibrium, extremism leads to interim
anti-incumbency.
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The equilibrium in Proposition 4 distinguishes itself from the other equilibria reported
above in three ways: (i) the voter chooses the challenger with probability 1 when indiffer-
ent, (ii) cost of political entry κ fully determines the amount of media coverage and (iii)
there is interim anti-incumbency. Thus in the event the media coverage is unable to pro-
vide any further information, the voter prefers to vote for the challenger. This implies that
along the set of equilibria, the high-quality entrant remains indifferent as irrespective of
what media coverage can deliver, he wins with probability 1. When platform extremism
decreases this gets supported by higher entry probability from low-quality challengers.
To keep such challengers indifferent between entry and staying out, the amount of media
coverage needs to remain fixed at 11+κ . Thus in equilibrium higher cost of political entry
can reduce media coverage and make political challengers less extreme.
4 Discussion
Our model of the investigative nature of the media is consistent with the Detached Watchdog
journalism milieu that is considered to be one of the most dominant journalistic cultures
in the Western world. Hanitzsch (2011) conducts a survey on 1800 journalists across 18
countries from both the developed and the developing world to find that the detached
watchdog milieu clearly dominates the journalistic field in most western countries, and
in particular in Austria, Australia, Germany, Switzerland and the United States. Its main
interest lies in providing its viewers with political information and considers itself as a
watchdog of elite political participants. The survey also finds that media falling under
this category are not driven by a desire to influence public opinion, set political agendas or
bring about social change.10 This is compatible with profit maximization in an electorate
that demands news regarding the calibre of political candidates. This makes media invest
in political information to inform the citizenry.11
Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) analyze a model of media and politics that shares some
features with our framework, though there are important differences. Unlike us, they
10 The milieu of Watchdog Journalism exists even when it is not ‘that detached’. For example, Puglisi and
Snyder (2008) analyze the coverage of U.S. political scandals by U.S. newspapers during the past decade to
find that Democratic-leaning newspapers give relatively more coverage to scandals involving Republican
politicians than scandals involving Democratic politicians, while Republican-leaning newspapers tend to
do the opposite.
11As argued in Prat and Stromberg (2005), even if commercial media caters news to the likes of voter
groups who finance them, commercial news can still generate more political information than state run
outlets.
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consider parties to be ideological and with no private information. Voters observe their
policy platforms but do not understand the exact payoff consequences and look at media
news for more information. Like in this paper, the media cares about size of viewership
but unlike us, it is also ideological and while it serves the electorate with electoral news, its
delivery can be biased. Voters prefer like-minded media in order to avoid distortions due
to this bias. As the media cares about size of viewership, a monopolist media typically
serves the median voter, generating neutral information, so that political parties choose
minimally divergent platforms as the standard Downsian centripetal forces come into
play. Thus incentives of the media to maximize viewership in their framework generates
populism. Of course, in their framework, parties have nothing to signal through policy
choice which plays a crucial role in our case.
In line with the equilibrium features of our results, there is evidence that voters indeed
believe that taking unpopular platforms is a signal of strength. A large body of literature
has developed that looks at what is called the marginality hypothesis which suggests
that weaker candidates are more likely to contest with electorally popular platforms.12
There have been a number of papers that try to explain this using strategic motives for
politicians to use extreme positions to signal strength. Kartik and McAfee (2007) generate
extremism in policies as rational politicians stand away from the median position to mimic
sincere candidates. Their result stems from the presence of candidates with character who
do not act strategically but instead according to their beliefs about what would be the
‘right’ policy (modeled as a random process that assigns probabilities to different policy
platforms) and thus do not cater to popular demand. Hence, taking unpopular positions
signal ‘character’, which is valued by the voters, thereby causing some strategic players
to also try and mimic this via picking non-median platforms (although it is shown that
they always assign a strictly positive probability to contesting with the median policy).13
Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) also obtain strategic extremism, but unlike us quality is
not a given characteristic but can be improved through unobservable investment. Honryo
(2013) obtains extremism as a result of candidates trying to signal their competence about
their ability to read the true state of the world. These papers do not however consider
12 Although Fiorina (1973) offers some evidence to the contrary, there is certainly strong evidence of the
marginality hypothesis (see Ansolabehere et. al. (2001) and Griffin (2006) for recent empirical support for
the hypothesis). In this respect, Bernhardt et al. (2011) provide a theoretical explanation for the mixed
empirical results on valence and extremism in a model of repeated elections with ideologically driven
politicians.
13 Note, Kartik and McAfee show such non-strategic types with ‘firm character’ is not strictly necessary
for their result to hold.
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explicitly the role of an informative media strategically which induces extremism. Bandy-
opadhyay et al. (2014) on the other hand consider a partially informative media that
induces extremism in a framework where politicians have unknown valence but in their
model the media is non-strategic.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a model of a profit-maximizing monopolistic media that will investi-
gate a political challenger with unknown quality. Voters pay to receive media coverage if
they find that the expected marginal value of media news is higher than the cost of access-
ing it. Given the informativeness of media coverage, we characterize conditions under
which high-quality candidates deliberately take extreme positions while low-quality can-
didates do so only some of the time. Media investment in trying to discover quality of
candidates with more extreme positions is higher as they rationally anticipate that voters
will want to pay more to purchase news about such candidates. This is because when
candidates take extreme positions, the voter’s marginal gain from learning about the can-
didate quality is higher, which increases his willingness to pay. High-quality candidates
gain as increased media attention makes it more likely that their types will be revealed
leading to their being elected. Strikingly, this ideological extremism arises (and serves
as a credible signal) in an environment where neither the media nor the candidate cares
about ideology, there is no media competition for news and the electorate not ideologically
divided. However, the presence of a media outlet is crucial as without its role as a source
of information, such polarization would not occur and the voter will not learn about the
quality of political challengers.14
For simplicity, we have assumed that the incumbent is located at the ideological
position of the decisive voter. This need not be the case, so long as there is sufficient
uncertainty about the challenger relative to the incumbent. If the challenger’s attributes
14AS we have shown, this does not mean that the media can’t sometimes get it wrong. For example,
some commentators suggest Modi is not the efficient leader he was portrayed as (See for example the
May 25, 2015 New York Times article by Ellen Barry at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/world/
asia/after-a-year-of-outsize-expectations-modi-adjusts-his-political-course-for-india.
html?_r=0, the BBC NEWS Asia article by Soutik Biswas on the same date at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-32790929 or the May 26, 2015 arti-
cle by Seetha Parthasarathi on Firstpost at http://www.firstpost.com/business/
a-promise-broken-pm-modis-maximum-failure-on-minimum-government-2262524.html ). Whether
such commentators are right is not the issue, but the possibility of a leader elected via media coverage
occasionally turning out to be of low quality is perfectly consistent with our model.
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are such that he will be preferred to the incumbent even if they are located at the same
point and no signaling takes place, the problem becomes trivial. Likewise if the incumbent
is always preferred. In other circumstances, the relative extremism of the challenger is all
that is needed for our conclusions to go through.
What would happen if there was no media? Clearly the mechanism of signaling
through extremism will break down as now there will be no credible source for verifying
quality and a low-quality challenger can mimic the actions of his high-quality counterpart
in the policy space with probability 1. This would then bring interim beliefs back to the
prior γ, which will then make all types of challengers to take the incumbent’s popular
stand by the usual Downsian arguments about convergence to the median. If γ ≥ ρi, one
would observe a populist challenger who would win the election, while if γ < ρi, then
the incumbent will go unchallenged. In any event, elections will not help the voter learn
about the quality of the challenger at the time of voting.
Multiple profit-seeking media outlets should in general improve informativeness in
our framework as various outlets will compete for viewership by making their news more
informative.15 This may, in part reduce the necessity of ideological extremism to attract
media attention. Hence, one would expect the equilibrium level of polarization to fall
with media competition compared to the dominant media case.16 However, while the
magnitude will vary, our essential insight of media induced polarization to strategically
get the voter to buy news should remain. This stands in sharp contrast with the results
obtained in Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) where multiple media identified by different
competing ideological bias enhances polarization by serving an ideologically divided
constituency. This occurs because ideology driven parties know they will be endorsed by
like-minded media outlets. In contrast, Perego and Yuksel (2015) show that, while with
increased competition and profit seeking media, voters individually get better informed,
the number of votes for the socially efficient candidate can fall. Their focus is also on an
ideologically divided electorate which tries to learn about both quality and ideology of
candidates and they do not study political entry and positioning. We instead concentrate
on an undivided constituency. It will of course also be interesting to study electoral
outcomes when the media market is competitive and outlets have both profit motives as
well as different ideological biases and the electorate is ideologically heterogeneous. Can
15Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) point out that voter heterogeneity plays a more crucial role in this
rather than media competition. However, this occurs in the presence of media bias in their model and so
the results may not hold in our framework.
16Competition or the presence of multiple outlets also reduces the chances of media capture as demon-
strated in Besley and Pratt (2006). We have assumed away the possibility of media capture in this framework.
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this lead to sorting of the electorate and therefore enhance polarization? This remains a
promising area for future research.
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